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We ﬁnd evidence that the underperformance of some IPOs, and ﬁrms in
concentrated industries, have common empirical roots. The most likely ex-
planation for both is a conﬂuence of two well known rational theories, which
predict that: (1) entrepreneurs in concentrated industries optimally time their
IPOs to coincide with a transition from growth to value (Maksimovic and
Pichler (2001)); and (2) the increase in systematic risk associated with this
transition generates lower returns (Pastor and Veronesi (2005)). We conﬁrm
this link using several tests based on speciﬁc portfolio returns, changes in sys-
tematic risk, unexpected real cashﬂows, and the characteristics of ﬁrms going
public. In addition, we present new evidence of return predictability, and a
new explanation for the role VC-backing plays in long-term IPO performance.
2Beginning with seminal works by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and
Brav and Gompers (1997), the debate regarding why and if IPO ﬁrms underperform
in the long term is well known. Existing research examines the issue of broad un-
derperformance, and also whether some variables can predict long-term IPO perfor-
mance in cross section. Cross sectional studies include, among many others, Carter,
Dark, and Singh (1998) (underwriter prestige), Jain and Kini (1994) (overhang),
Lowry (2003) (IPO volume), Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) (ﬂipping by insti-
tutional investors), Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan (2001)), and Teoh, Welch,
and Wong (1998) (earnings manipulation).
The importance of this literature is underscored by the large size of its predictable
returns, typically 8% to 10% annually. To explain these returns, most studies rely
on market ineﬃciency or behavioral explanations. For example, Ritter (1991) sup-
ports an explanation based on over-optimism. Baker and Wurgler (2000) attribute
underperformance following equity issuance more generally to market timing, where
issuers sell equity when stock prices are artiﬁcially inﬂated. Although it is likely that
behavioral theories indeed explain many of these ﬁndings, it is also important to ask
whether rational explanations also matter. We explore — for the ﬁrst time as far as
we know — exactly this “rational” link.1 In particular, we seek a uniﬁed explanation
of both the corporate ﬁnance and asset pricing issues underlying IPO performance.
Our focus is on industrial organization. A key motivation for this approach derives
from Hou and Robinson (2005), who show that industry competitiveness can explain
stock returns. They suggest that a rational risk-based explanation is the likely cause.
We ﬁnd that the underperformance of ﬁrms in concentrated industries reported in
Hou and Robinson (2005) (henceforth the “concentration premium) is unique to con-
centrated industries with an active IPO market. By conditioning on an active IPO
market, we ﬁnd that the unconditional concentration premium (3.8% to 4.4% per
annum) increases by roughly one third to (5.2% to 5.9%) even when we exclude IPO
ﬁrms themselves from the sample. More strikingly, the spread for IPO ﬁrms them-
selves is more than double (8.9% to 10.1% annually) the unconditional spread. In
contrast, industry concentration has no ability to predict returns in industries with-
out active IPO markets. Because all of our ﬁndings are robust to either including or
excluding observations from the hot IPO market of the late 1990s, we conclude that
these pricing patterns are pervasive. Therefore we aim to extend Hou and Robin-
son (2005)’s analysis and explore a common explanation for both the concentration
premium and long-term underperformance of some IPOs.
We ﬁnd that these return patterns are related to diﬀerences in how competitive
and concentrated IPO issuers make the decision to go public. Concentrated issuers
are more likely to follow Maksimovic and Pichler (2001), and go public when their
ﬁrm is transitioning from growth to value. Hence, the underperformance of IPO
ﬁrms we observe in concentrated industries can be explained by the rise in system-
atic (HML) risk that accompanies the transition from growth to value. The logic
1A contemporaneous paper by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005) explains the under-
performance of SEOs in a real options framework. They link SEO underperformance to gradual
declines in market betas post SEO. Our explanation of IPO underperformance is rooted in value
versus growth along with the decision to go public, which is entirely diﬀerent from their explanation
of SEO underperformance.
3behind why such an increase in priced systematic risk should result in lower stock
returns is based on Pastor and Veronesi (2005). Because industrial organization is a
common trait shared by ﬁrms in a given industry, we also ﬁnd spillover eﬀects. Our
ﬁndings suggest that observing a single ﬁrm’s IPO can increase the likelihood that
the entire industry is transitioning from growth to value. This spillover relationship
can fully explain the observed concentration premium in Hou and Robinson (2005).
In contrast, for IPO ﬁrms in competitive industries, we ﬁnd that exogenous innova-
tion shocks and institutional pressure from venture capital ﬁnanciers to exit quickly
are most likely to drive the decision to go public. Consequently, because these mo-
tives are exogenous, no increase in systematic risk is expected for these IPOs or their
industry rivals, and hence underperformance is also not expected. Our explanation
can be cast in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984): ﬁrms going public in concen-
trated industries (but not in competitive industries) reveal new information, i.e. that
they (and their entire industry) are transitioning from growth to value. 2
We ﬁnd considerable evidence supporting the link between industry concentra-
tions and going public decision patterns. Using tests of ﬁrm characteristics and risk
exposure, we ﬁnd that issuers pursuing IPOs in concentrated industries indeed do
so when their ﬁrms are transitioning from growth to value. On average, HML betas
increase by 4.5 basis points in the three years post IPO for each 0.01 increase in the
pre-IPO sales-based Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Consistent with less pres-
sure to raise funds quickly for investment and fewer growth options, concentrated-
industry IPO issuers spend less on R&D expenditures both pre-IPO and post-IPO.
They are also far less likely to have received VC backing, consistent with a history
of funding fewer expensive innovation shocks, and fewer ﬁnancial constraints. These
results suggest that concentrated issuers are less likely to face exogenous pressures
to go public, and hence these issuers likely have the freedom to go public at the time
of their own choosing. The lack of VC funding further increases timing ﬂexibility for
institutional reasons, as VCs might apply pressure to exit quickly in order to free up
resources for additional investment. Concentrated issuers also sell more secondary
shares at issuance, which is further consistent with the timing of the IPO being op-
timal from the issuer’s perspective. The evidence suggests that concentrated issuers
face less pressure to raise funds quickly, and have more ﬂexibility to go public at an
endogenously determined optimal time.
Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms going public in competitive industries are more
likely to do so in response to exogenous innovation shocks. These ﬁrms face compet-
itive pricing within their industries, and innovation is more likely to occur (Schum-
peter (1912)). When a competitive industry experiences innovation, ﬁrms must re-
spond quickly and raise external capital to fund new investment. We ﬁnd that
competitive IPO ﬁrms spend considerably more on research and development both
pre-IPO and post-IPO. Hence, it is likely that the purpose for going public is in-
deed to fund exogenous innovation shocks. Pre-IPO shareholders also sell fewer
secondary shares, consistent with the timing of the IPO being sub-optimal from
the owner’s perspective, and hence more likely that it was driven by an exogenous
2Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) ﬁnd empirical support for this relationship, and ﬁnd that
Italian ﬁrms are more likely to go public after high investment and growth. Chemmanur, He, and
Nandy (2005) also show that higher capital intensity increases the likelihood of going public.
4shock. Furthermore, these issuers are more likely to be VC-backed, and hence are
more susceptible to exogenous inﬂuence by VC ﬁrms who might seek early exit for
institutional reasons.
Overall, our evidence suggests that concentrated issuers are more likely to follow
the theoretical motives identiﬁed in Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) (i.e. they go
public when they are transitioning from growth to value), and competitive issuers
are less likely to do so. Consequently, the decision to issue an IPO in a concentrated
industry is informative, and can signal the entire industry’s transition from growth
to value. On the other hand, issuers going public in competitive industries do so
following exogenous innovation stocks. Provided that the innovation shock itself is
common knowledge, this exogeneity in IPO timing likely renders the decision to issue
IPOs in a competitive industry to be void of information regarding the ﬁrm making
the decision, and also uninformative regarding its industry.
Our ﬁndings provide broad support for Pastor and Veronesi (2005), who present
a rational theory of asset pricing, and suggest that ﬁrms experiencing increases in
systematic risk should experience lower returns. Importantly, traditional empirical
asset pricing tests, which assume factor loadings are constant over time, will report
underperformance when priced systematic risk suddenly increases. One simple way to
understand the negative link between increases in systematic risk and stock returns is
through the discount rate. Higher systematic risk increases the discount rate, which
in turn decreases the present value of the ﬁrm’s future cashﬂows, and thus the value
of the ﬁrm itself.
Our paper also contributes to the debate regarding whether IPO ﬁrms actually
underperform in the long run. Brav and Gompers (1997), Brav, Geczy, and Gom-
pers (2000), and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), among others, suggest that this
underperformance is not robust to standard multifactor asset pricing models that
control for risk. Schultz (2003) shows that the clustering of IPOs can lead to ex-post
underperformance even in an eﬃcient market, and suggests that future researchers
should use calendar-time return methods. Although Lougharn and Ritter (2000)
address many of these concerns, some scholars do not consider this debate to be fully
resolved.
We employ methods that address the concerns raised by these studies, and we
begin our analysis with a larger sample than previously used. We do ﬁnd evidence of
underperformance of some IPOs, but our ﬁndings also lend support to ideas presented
on both sides of this debate. In particular, we ﬁnd that one group of IPOs consistently
underperforms: non venture-backed IPOs residing in concentrated industries. We
also ﬁnd that some previously reported ﬁndings are not robust in our larger sample:
we ﬁnd little evidence that other IPOs underperform, that recent market returns
matter, or that IPO size plays any role. For the group that does underperform, we
ﬁnd that changes in risk is a likely explanation. In particular, underperformance is
most evident for IPOs where the transition from growth to value hypothesis suggests
it should be: concentrated industries and non-VC-backed IPOs. As discussed earlier,
these ﬁrms are most likely to optimally time their IPOs because they face fewer
exogenous shocks and less institutional pressures.
We also examine Hou and Robinson (2005)’s puzzling ﬁnding that unexpected
5real cash ﬂow shocks are positive and signiﬁcant in concentrated industries at the
same time that returns are negative and signiﬁcant. Although the non-negativity of
these real cashﬂow shocks can help to rule out the market ineﬃciency explanation
of the concentration premium, importantly, their paper does not explain why these
cash ﬂows are signiﬁcantly positive rather than zero. Our paper suggests that these
ﬁrms are more proﬁtable in the short run because the transition from growth to
value mechanistically implies a wholesale maturing of growth options. Hence, the
short-term proﬁt growth of these ﬁrms exceeds that of control ﬁrms as proﬁts from
these options are realized. This explanation suggests that underperformance still
arises despite higher proﬁts because these gains are more than oﬀset by undesirable
increases in systematic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes data and
the methodologies we use. Section II presents our ﬁndings on the relation between
industry concentration and long-term abnormal returns. Section III explores the
relation between industry concentration and unexpected proﬁtability. Section IV
looks at the diﬀerence in characteristics between concentrated IPOs and competitive
IPOs. Section V examines changes in risk exposure in the three years post IPO.
Section VI ﬁnds whether the performance of concentrated IPOs and non-VC backed
IPOs is linked, and section VII concludes.
I Data and Methodology
Issue-speciﬁc IPO data are from the Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. New Issues
Database. The sample consists of all U.S. IPOs issued between January 1, 1973 and
December 31, 2004. An IPO’s industry is identiﬁed by its three-digit SIC code, as
reported by CRSP. A total of 7,891 IPOs exist in this sample. Stock performance
data and ﬁrm ﬁnancial data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively.
We consider stock performance using monthly returns, and we present results
using two methods to ensure robustness. First we compute a ﬁrm’s abnormal return
as its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio matched on the
basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry adjusted book to market, and
past year returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)). Our second
methodology is to compute the monthly returns of various portfolios, and then deﬁne
abnormal performance as the intercept from regressing the portfolios’ excess returns
on the three Fama French factors (Lougharn and Ritter (2000)). We deﬁne a ﬁrm
to be “IPO ﬁrm” in a given month if the given ﬁrm went public in the past three
years. Importantly, our use of monthly returns avoids biases attributed to the high
variance and skewness of long-term returns.3. To avoid biases due to benchmark
contamination, we also eliminate all ﬁrms that went public in the last ﬁve years
from all benchmark portfolios and from the Fama-French factors as suggested by
Lougharn and Ritter (2000).
Our industry concentration measure is based on three-digit SIC codes. The main
concentration measure we consider is the HHI index based on COMPUSTAT sales
3See Fama (1998) and Barber and Lyon (1997)
6data, averaged over past three years, as in Hou and Robinson (2005). We also
compute an HHI index from COMPUSTAT segment data as a robustness check.
We deﬁne a ﬁrm’s change in systematic risk as the change in its annual factor
loadings (betas) using daily data. We begin by running daily time series regressions
for each stock on the three Fama French factors plus momentum (UMD) as follows.
ri,t − rf = α + β1 HML + β2 SMB + β3 MKT + β4 UMD +  (1)
The return ri,t is ﬁrm i’s return on day t, rf is the riskless rate, and the model is
estimated using daily data spanning one calendar year. The motivation for using
high frequency data is to reduce the impact of error-in-variables. To further mitigate
this problem, we also control for non-synchronous stock returns by adding a one day
lead and one day lag term to the estimation as in Dimson (1979), and we winsorize
the resulting factor loadings on a yearly basis at the 1% level.
To measure unexpected proﬁtability, we follow Fama and French (2000), Vuolteenaho
(2002), and Hou and Robinson (2005). We deﬁne unexpected proﬁtability as the
residual term from the following regression:
Et
At
= α0 + α1
Vt
At







Using COMPUSTAT data, the earnings to asset ratio (E/A) is data item 18
divided by data item 6, ﬁrm market value to asset ratio (V/A) is (market cap at the
end of last year (CRSP) plus total assets (item 6) minus book common equity (item
60)) divided by data item 6, and the dividend to book value of equity (D/B) is data
item 21 divided by data item 60. The non-dividend payer dummy equals one if the
ﬁrm did not pay any dividend in the given year.
Table I displays summary statistics. There are a total of 1,785,322 ﬁrm-month
observations of CRSP stock returns. About 5% of these observations are identiﬁed
as IPO observations, i.e., within three years of IPO date. For variables that are
observed once per year, we have a total of 160,243 ﬁrm-year observations. The asset
pricing models we use to calculate abnormal ﬁrm performance are well speciﬁed,
because the average monthly abnormal return is 0% on average. This is consistent
with the notion that the market is eﬃcient on average.
II Industry Concentration and Long-term Abnor-
mal Returns
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Lougharn and Ritter (2000) docu-
ment that IPO ﬁrms underperform in the long run relative to market-wide bench-
marks. To examine whether this underperformance is related to industry concentra-
tion, in each year, we form concentration quintiles based on the Sales HHI at the
3-digit SIC industry level. Quintiles are labeled one through ﬁve, with one being the
most competitive quintile, and ﬁve being the most concentrated quintile.
7Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), we calculate a ﬁrm’s
abnormal return as its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of its bench-
mark portfolio. The benchmark portfolios are formed on the basis of NYSE/AMEX
breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year returns. These
benchmark portfolios are purged of IPOs issued in the past ﬁve years, as suggested
by Lougharn and Ritter (2000). We deﬁne an industry to be “IPO industry” if there
is at least one IPO in that industry over the past twelve months.4
Panel A of Table II reports sample-wide results from year 1973 to 2004. Panel B of
the table reports results excluding the 1999-2000 hot IPO market. Row one replicates
the ﬁndings of Hou and Robinson (2005), and conﬁrms the negative relationship
between industry concentration and monthly abnormal returns. Rows two and three
show that this relationship is entirely driven by industries with an active IPO market.
Moreover, our exclusion of IPO ﬁrms from our test of IPO industries in row two
further illustrates that the concentration premium, although linked to IPO activity,
is not entirely driven by the returns of IPO ﬁrms themselves. However, row four
shows that the concentration premium is indeed largest for IPO ﬁrms.
The results for non-IPO ﬁrms in IPO industries in row two can be viewed as a
“spillover eﬀect”. In turn, this underperformance generates the unconditional result
reported in Hou and Robinson (2005). Overall, these patterns (largest for IPO ﬁrms,
next largest for same industry ﬁrms, and non-existent for other ﬁrms) are consistent
with information ﬁrst being revealed by the actions of IPO ﬁrms (eﬀect is largest),
and then spilling over into the industries in which they operate (eﬀect is smaller
but still signiﬁcant). Panel B conﬁrms that these patterns are not driven by the
1999-2000 hot IPO market.
Table III examines the relationship between abnormal returns and concentration
using monthly Fama MacBeth regressions. As before, Panel A includes the whole
sample, and Panel B excludes the hot IPO market of 1999 and 2000. The dependent
variable in all regressions is the monthly abnormal return of each ﬁrm.
Our regressions are similar to those in Hou and Robinson (2005), and row (1)
reproduces their ﬁnding that ﬁrms in concentrated industries underperform those
in competitive industries. Because the dependent variable, the monthly abnormal
return, already controls for the traditional four risk factors, these results cannot be
explained by each ﬁrm’s average exposure to HML, SMB, MKT and momentum
risk. Finding similar results, Hou and Robinson (2005) suggest that the negative
relationship between concentration and returns is driven by a new competitive risk
factor. Additional tests (presented later) conﬁrm that risk exposure matters, but
our analysis supports the conclusion that changes in exposure to a well known risk
factor (HML), rather than an entirely new risk factor, is responsible for these return
patterns.
Table III also shows that if we separate the sample into ﬁrms in IPO industries
and compare them to ﬁrms in non-IPO industries, this negative relation between
concentration and abnormal returns only exists for ﬁrms in IPO industries. Fur-
4We use a shorter horizon of one year to identify “IPO industries” rather than the three years
used to identify “IPO ﬁrms”. If we use a three year horizon for industries, a majority of industry-
years would be tagged as IPO industries.
8thermore, this relationship in IPO industries is stronger than in the overall sample.
Based on the Sales HHI standard deviation of 0.3098 reported in Table I, the table
suggests that one additional standard deviation of Sales HHI decreases expected an-
nual returns by 1.4% for the entire sample, and 2.3% for ﬁrms residing in industries
that had at least one IPO (even when IPO ﬁrms themselves are excluded). Firms
residing in industries without IPOs experience no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in expected
return whether they are in a competitive industry or in a concentrated industry.
More strikingly, row (6) suggests that IPO ﬁrms experience a 4.8% reduction in
expected return when they are issued in an industry with one standard deviation
higher Sales HHI.
Within the entire sample including all observations, rows (4) and (5) illustrate the
same ﬁnding. In particular, comparing row (1) to row (4) shows that including the
interaction term of sales HHI X IPO industry dummy, renders the unconditional sales
HHI coeﬃcient to become insigniﬁcant. In contrast, the coeﬃcient of the interaction
term is signiﬁcantly negative at -0.0066, which is nearly 70% larger than the sales
HHI coeﬃcient in row (1). The IPO industry ﬂag itself is not signiﬁcant, indicating
that industry concentration within an active IPO market is what matters most.
We conclude that the underperformance of concentrated IPO industries drives the
observed concentration premium. Because the IPO market is active during booms,
and dormant during recessions, the cyclical nature of the IPO market might also
explain why the concentration premium in Hou and Robinson (2005) varies over
time.
Rows (5) and (9) show that using the number of IPOs instead of a dummy
identifying the existence of at least one IPO, the results are similar, but are not
statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the existence of at least one IPO is more important
than whether or not many IPOs are issued at the same time.
III Industry Concentration and Unexpected Prof-
itability
Following Hou and Robinson (2005), we examine the relationship between industry
concentration and unexpected cash ﬂow shocks to ascertain whether observed un-
derperformance is accompanied by real decreases in cash ﬂows (negative cash ﬂow
shocks). The existence of negative shocks, if they are predictable, would lend sup-
port to behavioral explanations, as it would suggest that ex-ante prices were above
fundamental valuations. In contrast, evidence of zero shocks or positive shocks can
be viewed as evidence against behavioral explanations that are rooted in overvalu-
ation, and can thus be seen as support favoring rational hypotheses. Unexpected
proﬁtability is measured as the residual from Equation (2) as in Fama and French
(2000), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Hou and Robinson (2005).
Although we do not report the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression in equation
(2) to conserve space, we can report that our coeﬃcient estimates are in line with
previous works. Firms with higher lagged cash ﬂows (
Et−1
At−1), higher dividend ra-
tios (Dt
Bt), and higher value ratios ( Vt
At) are more proﬁtable. Firms that do not pay
9dividends (DDt) are less proﬁtable. The residuals from this regression, unexpected
proﬁtability, are used as the dependent variable in Table IV.
Table IV reports Fama-MacBeth regressions where the dependent variable is each
ﬁrm’s annual unexpected proﬁtability. We conﬁrm Hou and Robinson (2005)’s ﬁnd-
ing of a positive relationship between industry concentration and unexpected prof-
itability in rows (1) and (7) for both the full sample and the subsample excluding
the hot IPO market.
As in our analysis of abnormal returns, we separate the sample into ﬁrms in IPO
industries and ﬁrms in non-IPO industries in rows (2) and (3). The table shows
that the positive relationship is slightly larger in magnitude for IPO industries, and
insigniﬁcant in the non-IPO industry group. Rows (4) and (5) show that including
an IPO industry dummy and its interaction term with Sales HHI in the uncondi-
tional sample renders the unconditional Sales HHI coeﬃcient to be insigniﬁcant. In
contrast, the interaction term (IPO dummy x Sales HHI) is signiﬁcantly positive. If
we base the interaction term on the number of IPOs rather than the IPO dummy,
the results are similar. This suggests that the positive cash ﬂow shocks reported by
Hou and Robinson (2005) are robust, but also that they are driven by positive shocks
occurring uniquely in industries with active IPO markets.
Given existing literature, it is a mystery that concentrated industries with active
IPO markets can experience both positive cash ﬂow shocks and negative abnormal
returns. Because our ﬁnding of a link between positive cashﬂow shocks and under-
performance is strong, and also robust across subsamples where each matters most,
viable explanations of the concentration premium must explain both results. Our
uniﬁed explanation suggests that the positive cashﬂow shocks are a direct result of
the transition from growth to value. This transition implies a rapid exercise and
maturing of growth options, and this maturing process can explain the observed in-
creasing short-run proﬁtability relative to control ﬁrms. These positive shocks are
consistent with inferior returns because these short run proﬁtability gains are more
than oﬀset by the undesirable increase in the discount rate associated with this tran-
sition. The following sections will further explore this hypothesis.
IV Industry Concentration and Characteristics of
Issuing Firms
Table V examines whether IPOs in concentrated industries have diﬀerent character-
istics relative to IPOs in competitive industries. One observation is one IPO, and
the table uses the Fama-MacBeth regression method to ensure that all years receive
equal weighting.5 Rows (1) and (2) show that IPO ﬁrms in competitive industries
spend far more on research and development (COMPUSTAT item 46 normalized by
total assets, item 6) both pre-IPO and post-IPO, although rows (5) and (6) show that
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist in capital expenditures. The large scale diﬀerences in
research and development are consistent with IPO ﬁrms in competitive industries
5Results are robust to OLS or panel data methods (not displayed).
10making the decision to go public in order to fund investment associated with costly
innovation shocks. Their smaller R&D expenditures in concentrated industries sug-
gests that concentrated issuers are less likely to be constrained by such shocks, and
are likely to go public at the optimal time of their own choosing. Hence, rational
models of IPO timing are more likely to apply to issuers in concentrated industries
rather than those in competitive industries.
Table V also shows that IPOs in concentrated industries are less likely to be
backed by venture capital, and tend to sell more of their own (secondary) shares at
the time of IPO.6 This suggest that concentrated issuers do not face the ﬁnancial
and institutional constraints associated with VC-ﬁnancing, and are more free to
issue IPOs at an optimal time of their own choosing. The observed higher levels of
secondary sale shares in concentrated IPOs is further consistent with the timing of
these IPOs indeed being more optimal from the owner’s perspective.
All results are robust to the exclusion of the hot IPO market from 1999 to 2000.
Put together, the results of Table V show that IPOs in concentrated industries
are diﬀerent from IPOs in competitive industries. Existing research on IPO timing
may help to explain the link between these characteristics and observed underper-
formance. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) model ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions between
public (IPO) capital and private venture capital. They show that it is optimal for ma-
ture ﬁrms to choose public capital, and for immature growth ﬁrms to choose private
capital. Because Table V suggests that only concentrated issuers have the ﬂexibil-
ity to follow any optimal theory of IPO timing, it follows that this theory predicts
that concentrated issuers (and not competitive issuers) are undergoing the transi-
tion from growth to value. Stated diﬀerently in terms of Myers and Majluf (1984),
observing the decision to go public in concentrated industries reveals the likelihood
of this transition, but observing a similar decision in a competitive industry is void
of information.
The next section tests whether IPO ﬁrms in concentrated industries are indeed
transitioning toward value ﬁrms, and whether those in competitive industries are
not. The answer is yes.
V Industry Concentration and Changes in Sys-
tematic Risk
Table VI formally tests the relation between industry concentration and changes in
risk exposure. Individual ﬁrms’ risk exposure (betas) are calculated using daily data
in a given year. We take three measures to reduce error in variables: (1) we use high
frequency daily data, (2) we control for non-synchronous stock returns as in Dimson
(1979), and (3) all ﬁrm betas are winsorized at the 1% level on an annual basis.
The table examines the relationship between industry concentration and the
three-year change in risk exposure (beta) for each of the three Fama-French fac-
6Secondary shares are shares sold by initial owners. Primary shares are sold by the ﬁrm going
public, and proceeds are delivered to the ﬁrm itself for new investment rather than to the owners.
11tors plus momentum. Within the entire sample, row (1) shows that sales HHI is
associated with a positive change in HML beta. Rows (2), (3), and (4) show that
this positive association is driven by ﬁrms in IPO industries only. In fact, ﬁrms in
non-IPO industries experience a signiﬁcant decline in HML beta over the following
three years. In contrast, within the subsample of IPO industries, the positive as-
sociation between industry concentration and increases in HML beta is statistically
signiﬁcant, and also larger in magnitude than the association in the whole sample.
Most strikingly, row (4) shows that the positive association between industry con-
centration and HML beta increases is statistically and economically largest within
the sample of IPO ﬁrms alone. Here, the positive coeﬃcient is roughly three times
larger than the positive coeﬃcient noted for the entire sample.
Panels B and D show that changes in two other risk factors, SMB and momentum,
are not signiﬁcantly related to industry concentration. However, Panel C documents
that changes in the market factor are signiﬁcant. Within the entire sample, com-
petitive industries are associated with an increase in market beta over three years.
Like the changes in HML risk noted above, this increase also appears to be stronger
for competitive IPO ﬁrms and for ﬁrms residing in competitive IPO industries. One
explanation is that the technological innovations that appear to fuel IPO issuance in
competitive industries might lead these industries to become a larger fraction of the
overall market portfolio, thus increasing their market beta. It also might be the case
that the outcome of investment following innovations is tied to the performance of
the economy as a whole, and because good economic performance can help to ensure
success. However, because the dynamics of technological innovation are outside the
scope of our study, we leave examination of this issue to future studies.
Importantly, because Fama and French (1993) show that the market factor is not
a “priced” risk factor in the cross section of equity returns, the changes in market risk
in Panel C likely are not important in understanding equity returns (the topic of our
study). In contrast, Fama and French (1993) present evidence that HML is a priced
risk factor, and hence the increases in HML risk observed in Panel A are highly
relevant in explaining the cross section of expected stock returns. In particular,
the evidence suggests that IPO ﬁrms and non-IPO ﬁrms in IPO industries are both
transitioning from growth to value.
VI Industry Concentration and Venture Capital
Brav and Gompers (1997) show that VC-backed IPOs do not underperform in the
long run. Given that competitive industries have a larger percentage of VC-backed
IPOs than concentrated industries do, it is natural to ask whether the concentration
premium results are driven by, or linked to, VC ﬁnancing patterns.
We begin our exploration by examining long-term IPO performance within ﬁve
sub-groupings of IPO ﬁrms based on: 1) industry concentration; 2) VC backing; 3)
whether the given IPO is issued in a high volume market (“Market Temperature”);
4) whether it is issued after high market returns; and 5) whether it is a large or small
IPO. Table VII and table VIII report the results using two diﬀerent methodologies.
12Table VII employs the calendar-time portfolio return method used in Lougharn and
Ritter (2000). Table VIII reports calendar-time abnormal returns relative to bench-
mark portfolios as in Brav and Gompers (1997). Following Lougharn and Ritter
(2000), for both methods, we purge ﬁrms that went public in the last ﬁve years from
the factor portfolios, and from the benchmark portfolios, respectively.7
For all ﬁve classiﬁcation variables, IPOs are sorted into two portfolio groups
using annual sorts. Information needed to classify ﬁrms is public information that
is known prior to the period of time over which we measure returns, so our results
are predictive in nature. In order to compute an IPO’s “Market Temperature”, we
ﬁrst deﬁne a monthly variable, the IPO ratio, as the number of IPOs in a given
month divided by the number of publicly traded ﬁrms on the CRSP tapes in the
same month. We then deﬁne a given IPO’s market temperature as the IPO ratio in
the month preceding the given IPO date minus the mean IPO ratio over the past
36 months, divided by the IPO ratio’s standard deviation over the past 36 months.
This variable thus measures whether the IPO market is hot (in terms of volume)
relative to conditions over the past three years. Past market performance is the
equal weighted market return over the three years preceding the issue date. IPO size
is the natural logarithm of the issue proceeds.
Rows (1) and (2) of Table VII show that IPOs did experience abnormal returns
that are negative, but also that these unconditional returns are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant in our extended sample. However, comparing row (1) and row (2) shows that
purging the Fama-French factors of IPO ﬁrms, as suggested by Lougharn and Ritter
(2000), has a signiﬁcant impact on the both the coeﬃcient magnitude and the signif-
icance level of observed IPO underperformance. After this adjustment, however, the
still non-signiﬁcant T-statistic of -1.32 suggests that broad IPO underperformance is
not robust in our larger sample.
We believe the mixed signals regarding unconditional IPO underperformance
might be explained by the possibility that one identiﬁable group of IPOs (e.g. those
without VC backing and in concentrated industries) does consistently underperform,
and the rest do not. Under this hypothesis, outcomes of tests of broad IPO underper-
formance would hinge upon the percentage of IPOs that are in the underperforming
group versus those that are not. The weaker evidence of broad underperformance
in the extended sample would thus be consistent with more recent IPOs, especially
those in the 1990s, having a higher tendency to be venture backed and being issued
in competitive industries. This conjecture is backed by the well known inﬂux of
venture backed IPOs during the technology boom, and the declining concentration
associated with the increase in the number of ﬁrms during this time. Particularly
supportive of this logic, rows (3) to (6) indicate that IPOs issued in concentrated
industries, and non-VC backed IPOs, consistently underperform in both samples
even as unconditional IPO underperformance appears to be weaker in the extended
sample. Comparing Table VII to Table VIII conﬁrms that these ﬁndings are also
robust to both methodologies.
The examination of underperformance versus market temperature and prior mar-
ket returns is a direct test of the behavioral market timing explanation of IPO un-
7We thank Jay Ritter for providing purged HML and SMB risk factors on his website.
13derperformance. This theory states that ﬁrms issue IPOs in hot markets because
IPO valuations have risen above fundamentals. Hence, this theory would predict
that IPOs issued following high prior market returns, and IPOs issued when IPO
volume (market temperature) is high, should experience the worst ex-post perfor-
mance as ﬁrm valuations eventually “correct”.8 The results in Panels D and E from
both Table VII and Table VIII do not square well with this prediction. Panel D
shows that IPOs issued in colder (not hotter) market temperatures underperform.
Panel E shows virtually no relationship between recent market returns and ex-post
performance. We conclude that behavioral theories that rely on overvaluation likely
do not explain IPO underperformance.
From panel F in Table VII and Table VIII, there is also no clear evidence regarding
whether small or large IPOs tend to underperform in the long run.
We next examine whether the results for VC-backing, industry concentration,
and market temperature are driven by the same underperforming ﬁrms, or whether
these variables contain unique information. Table IX presents average abnormal re-
turns based on two dimensional sorts along these dimensions. Panel A shows that the
concentration and VC-backed eﬀects are distinct, and in fact, roughly additive. Con-
centrated non-VC backed IPOs underperform more than any other group at 0.88%
per month (10.5% annually). For the groups of competitive non-VC backed IPOs
and concentrated VC-backed IPOs, the two eﬀects cancel, and we do not observe
any robust underperformance.
Panel B of Table IX examines the concentration eﬀect versus market temperature.
The table shows that virtually no relationship exists between market temperature and
IPO performance once controls for concentration are included. Concentrated IPOs
underperform regardless of market temperature. The unconditional link between
temperature and underperformance was likely driven by the fact that concentrated
industries, by deﬁnition, have fewer ﬁrms. Hence, IPOs in these industries likely
come in smaller waves, and such market conditions would thus be classiﬁed as cold
more often than competitive IPO waves would.
Panel C conﬁrms our earlier ﬁnding that non-VC backed IPOs underperform
(rows 11 and 12), but also shows that these IPOs underperform regardless of whether
the IPO market is hot or cold. We conclude that temperature plays little role in
IPO performance. This evidence is consistent with rational explanations of observed
underperformance, and raises the bar for behavioral explanations, which often rely
on return reversals being more extreme following hot markets.
Overall, table IX suggests that concentrated non-VC backed IPOs underperform
more than any other group of IPOs in the long run. This result is consistent with
this group of issuers having the most ﬂexibility to go public at the optimal time
of their own choosing, which as our earlier ﬁndings suggest, is when their ﬁrm is
8Lougharn and Ritter (2000) use a diﬀerent methodology to examine IPO volume ﬁnd a result
opposite to ours. Importantly, the diﬀerence is due to whether IPO volume is measured at the
time of issuance (our approach) or during the ex-post return window (their approach). Because our
agenda is only to examine whether the actual decision to go public is rooted in behavioral biases,
we focus on whether or not the market is hot or cold at the time of issuance, as ex-post conditions
are not known when this decision is made.
14transitioning from growth to value. Following our earlier results concerning tests of
increases in systematic risk, we now explore whether systematic risk changes can also
explain this section’s results concerning non-VC backed IPO underperformance.
Table X examines whether changes in HML risk are indeed linked to the same
characteristics that predict IPO underperformance. The table’s dependent variable,
three-year change in HML exposure, is deﬁned exactly as in Table VI, but now we
restrict the sample to IPO ﬁrms alone. In order to test this speciﬁc hypothesis,
we include the following explanatory variables in the Fama-MacBeth cross sectional
regressions: VC backed dummy, log of IPO size, past 3-year market returns, and
relative IPO market temperature. The table shows that the VC backed dummy is
signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with HML beta changes. Ceteris paribus, a
non-VC backed IPO on average experiences a 58 basis point increase in its HML
beta in the three years following its IPO relative to VC backed IPOs. Table X also
conﬁrms our earlier ﬁnding that concentrated industry IPOs experience increases in
HML betas. Row (2) shows that these two variables remain signiﬁcant when regressed
alone. Finally, rows (3) shows that the concentration eﬀect is especially robust, and
not inﬂuenced by multicollinearity, as it remains signiﬁcant in a univariate model.
The table also shows that IPO size and hot market variables do not correlate with
changes in risk.
We conclude that Table X provides broad support for the uniﬁed rational ex-
planation of IPO underperformance and the concentration premium, and illustrates
the link to the transition from growth to value. Concentrated non-VC backed IPOs
are most likely to follow Maksimovic and Pichler (2001)’s prediction of optimal IPO
timing, thus they experience the largest change in risk exposure. In turn, this group
of IPOs underperforms the most.
VII Conclusion
We present strong evidence that the underperformance of some IPO ﬁrms, and the
concentration premium documented in Hou and Robinson (2005), have common em-
pirical roots. Several tests based on speciﬁc portfolio returns, changes in systematic
risk, unexpected real cashﬂows, and the characteristics of ﬁrms going public support
this hypothesis. These tests also lead us to conclude that a rational theory of IPO
timing and increased systematic risk explains our ﬁndings. The theoretical explana-
tion draws from important contributions made in both the corporate ﬁnance and the
asset pricing literature.
Our uniﬁed explanation is rooted in the hypothesis that ﬁrms going public in con-
centrated industries have the ﬂexibility to do so at the optimal time of their choosing,
and that this decision is made following the theoretical predictions of Maksimovic
and Pichler (2001): when their ﬁrm is transitioning from growth to value. In con-
trast, competitive IPO issuers have little ﬂexibility because their IPO decision is
more likely to be forced by exogenous innovation shocks requiring quick ﬁnancing
as in Schumpeter (1912), or by venture capital ﬁnanciers demanding quick exit. In
turn, the transition from growth to value, which we observe more frequently in con-
15centrated industries, directly implies an increase in systematic (HML) risk. Rational
asset pricing theory presented in Pastor and Veronesi (2005) explains why these
ﬁrms “underperform”. This theoretical explanation can also be cast in the language
of Myers and Majluf (1984). Observing the decision to go public in a concentrated
industry reveals a transition from growth to value. Observing the same decision in
a competitive industry is uninformative.
The uniﬁed theory can also explain the seemingly mysterious positive cash ﬂow
surprises that accompany the underperformance associated with the concentration
premium reported in Hou and Robinson (2005). In particular, the transition from
growth to value, although accompanied by a decline in realized returns, should pro-
duce positive cash ﬂow surprises because the wholesale maturing of growth options
should generate cash ﬂow increases above those of control ﬁrms. Finally, our results
shed new light on the role of VC backing in predicting IPO performance. A lack of
VC backing appears to increase the issuer’s ﬂexibility to optimally time IPOs because
VCs often seek quick exit. Hence, non-VC backed IPOs are likely to underperform
for the same reason concentrated industry IPOs do.
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18Table I: Summary statistics
Explanation: A ﬁrm’s abnormal return is its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio matched
on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry adjusted book to market, and past year returns as in
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). A ﬁrm is tagged as an “IPO ﬁrm” in a given month if the ﬁrm
had its IPO in the last three years. Unexpected proﬁtability is obtained from Fama MacBeth regressions as in
Fama and French (2000). A ﬁrm’s Sales HHI is the Herﬁndahl index based on sales over all ﬁrms residing its three
digit SIC industry (averaged over the past three years). Betas are estimated using daily data and two measures are
taken to reduce error-in-variables. First, each beta is the sum of three regression coeﬃcients: same day, past day,
and one day forward. Second, all betas are winsorized at the 1% level on an annual basis. A monthly observation is
tagged as an “Industry IPO ﬂag” if the given ﬁrm resides in a three digit SIC code that experienced at least one
IPO over the past twelve months. The number of IPOs is the number of IPOs in the given industry. Research and
Development along with Capital Expenditures are taken from COMPUSTAT, and are normalized by assets. The
Venture Capital Backed dummy is one for ﬁrms ﬁnanced by Venture Capital ﬁrms. Overhang is the number of
shares retained by the entrepreneur (for all classes) divided by shares ﬁled (including primary and secondary
shares).
Standard Number of
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Panel A: Variables observed once per ﬁrm-month
Abnormal Return 0.0000 0.1762 –1.1920 23.5040 1,785,322
Raw Return 0.0145 0.1896 –0.9810 24.0000 1,785,322
IPO ﬁrm dummy 0.0501 0.2180 0.0000 1.0000 1,785,322
Panel B: Variables observed once per ﬁrm-year
Unexpected proﬁtability –0.0024 0.3745 –12.06486 13.578 160,243
Earnings/Assets 0.0136 0.5423 –12.19214 0.440 160,243
Dividend/Book Value 0.0198 0.0405 0.000 0.4879 160,243
Value/Assets 2.7456 62.2407 0.000 11477 160,243
Non dividend payer dummy 0.5815 0.4933 0.000 1.000 160,243
HML beta –0.8425 1.3641 –6.3039 5.5202 165,688
SMB beta 0.5306 1.2092 –3.1749 5.6040 165,688
MKT beta 0.8284 0.7326 –2.1722 4.2642 165,688
UMD beta 0.0380 1.1685 –6.1196 4.8326 165,688
3-Year Change in HML beta 0.12134 1.7815 –11.106 11.098 134,531
3-Year Change in SMB beta –0.0724 1.4791 –9.1552 8.9264 134,531
3-Year Change in MKT beta –0.0453 0.8372 –7.1180 6.2678 134,531
3-Year Change in UMD beta 0.0057 1.6530 –8.8753 8.2259 134,531
Panel C: Variables observed once per industry-year
Industry Sales HHI 0.4719 0.3098 0.000 1.000 10,247
IPO industry dummy 0.4165 0.4930 0.000 1.000 10,247
Number of IPOs 0.8921 3.9220 0.000 155 10,247
Panel D: Variables observed once per IPO
Pre-IPO CAPX/Assets 0.104 0.120 0.000 1.586 5,780
Post-IPO CAPX/Assets 0.097 0.113 0.000 1.140 6,771
Pre-IPO R & D/Assets 0.107 0.480 0.000 33.0 7,891
Post-IPO R & D/Assets 0.047 0.099 0.000 1.985 7,891
Overhang 2.968 8.188 0.000 609.2 7,870
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table V: Fama-MacBeth regressions of IPO characteristics
Explanation: The table displays Fama MacBeth regressions with t-statistics in parentheses. Panel A includes all
observations from 1972 to 2004, and Panel B excludes the hot IPO market of 1999 and 2000. The dependent
variable varies by speciﬁcation as noted. Research and Development along with Capital Expenditures are taken
from COMPUSTAT, and are normalized by assets. The Venture Capital Backed dummy is one for ﬁrms ﬁnanced
by Venture Capital ﬁrms. Overhang is the number of shares retained by the entrepreneur (for all classes) divided
by shares ﬁled (including primary and secondary shares). A ﬁrm’s Sales HHI is the Herﬁndahl index based on sales
over all ﬁrms residing its three digit SIC industry (averaged over the past three years).
Sales HHI Sales HHI Obser- Average
Variable Coeﬃcient t Statistic vations R-Squared
Panel A: full sample
(1) Pre-IPO Research and Development -0.126 -5.430 7,891 0.033
(2) Post-IPO Research and Development -0.073 -9.618 7,891 0.056
(3) Venture Capital Backed -0.249 -7.578 7,891 0.023
(4) Overhang -1.188 -2.707 7,870 0.025
(5) Pre-IPO Capital Expenditures -0.056 -0.799 5,780 0.088
(6) Post-IPO Capital Expenditures -0.016 -1.167 6,771 0.018
Panel B: excluding 1999-2000 hot IPO market
(7) Pre-IPO Research and Development -0.115 -5.101 7,068 0.034
(8) Post-IPO Research and Development -0.072 -9.067 7,068 0.058
(9) Venture Capital Backed -0.242 -7.042 7,068 0.023
(10) Overhang -1.217 -2.621 7,047 0.026
(11) Pre-IPO Capital Expenditures -0.060 -0.807 5,031 0.093
(12) Post-IPO Capital Expenditures -0.019 -1.285 6,006 0.019
23Table VI: Fama-MacBeth regressions of risk changes
Explanation: The table displays Fama MacBeth regressions with t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the three year change in ﬁrm level HML beta (Panel A), SMB beta (Panel B), MKT beta (Panel C), and
UMD beta (Panel D). The regressions includes all observations from 1973 to 2004. Risk exposures (betas) are
estimated using daily data over one calendar year using the following model:
ri,t − rf = α1 + β1 HML + β2 SMB + β3 MKT + β4 UMD + 
The dependent variables for changes in HML, SMB, MKT, and UMD respectively, are the diﬀerences between year
t and year t+3 in the estimates of β1, β2, β3, and β4. The independent variable “initial risk exposure” is the HML,
SMB, MKT, or UMD beta (factor loading) from the initial year t. Three measures are taken to reduce
error-in-variables. First, betas are estimated using daily data. Second, each beta is the sum of three regression
coeﬃcients: same day, past day, and one day forward. Third, all betas are winsorized at the 1% level on an annual
basis. A ﬁrm’s Sales HHI is the Herﬁndahl index based on sales over all ﬁrms residing its three digit SIC industry
(averaged over the past three years). A yearly observation is tagged as an “Industry IPO ﬂag” if the given ﬁrm
resides in a three digit SIC code that experienced at least one IPO over the past year. A ﬁrm is tagged as an “IPO
ﬁrm” in a given year if the ﬁrm had its IPO in the last three years.
Lagged
Risk Sales Risk Number of
Sample Factor HHI Exposure Obs.
Panel A: three-year changes in HML beta
(1) All ﬁrms HML 0.1409 –0.7741 127,839
(3.633) (–24.277)
(2) Non-IPO Firms in IPO industries HML 0.2628 –0.7733 57,383
(3.125) (–24.227)
(3) Non-IPO Firms in non-IPO industries HML –0.1318 –0.8257 54,579
(–3.778) (–27.363)
(4) IPO ﬁrms only HML 0.4462 –0.7651 19,651
(5.466) (–30.170)
Panel B: three-year changes in SMB beta
(5) All ﬁrms SMB –0.0045 –0.7687 127,839
(–0.124) (–37.463)
(6) Non-IPO Firms in IPO industries SMB 0.0160 –0.7493 57,383
(0.229) (–35.499)
(7) Non-IPO Firms in non-IPO industries SMB 0.1596 –0.7807 54,579
(1.863) (–39.321)
(8) IPO ﬁrms only SMB –0.1431 –0.8804 19,651
(–1.643) (–44.542)
Panel C: three-year changes in MKT beta
(9) All ﬁrms MKT –0.0834 –0.6341 127,839
(–3.930) (–29.961)
(10) Non-IPO Firms in IPO industries MKT –0.1285 –0.6361 57,383
(–1.949) (–28.609)
(11) Non-IPO Firms in non-IPO industries MKT 0.0306 –0.6577 54,579
(1.937) (–28.791)
(12) IPO ﬁrms only MKT –0.1517 –0.6818 19,651
(–3.609) (–27.966)
Panel D: three-year changes in UMD beta
(13) All ﬁrms UMD –0.0315 –1.0411 127,839
(–0.952) (–25.450)
(14) Non-IPO Firms in IPO industries UMD –0.1219 –1.0506 57,383
(–1.340) (–26.620)
(15) Non-IPO Firms in non-IPO industries UMD 0.0016 –1.0246 54,579
(0.064) (–25.257)






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table VIII: Calendar-Time averaged abnormal returns for various IPO portfolios
Explanation: The table reports average monthly abnormal returns (with t-statistics in parenthesis) for various
groups of IPOs. A monthly return in CRSP is identiﬁed as an IPO return if the given month is before the IPO’s
third anniversary. A ﬁrm’s abnormal return is its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio
matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year
returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Benchmark portfolios are purged of ﬁrms prior to
their ﬁfth IPO anniversary. The table presents results both for the full sample (1973 to 2003) and for a sample that
closely matches the one used in Lougharn and Ritter (2000). Each panel reports average abnormal returns for
portfolios comprised of IPOs based on various groupings. In all cases, IPOs are sorted into two portfolio groups
using annual sorts. The Sales HHI is the Herﬁndahl index based on sales over all ﬁrms residing its three digit SIC
industry (averaged over the past three years). The venture capital dummy is one if the ﬁrm is venture capital
backed. Log IPO size is the natural logarithm of the issue proceeds. The Past 3-year Market return is the equal
weighted market return over the three years preceding the issue date. The IPO ratio is equal to the number of
IPOs in a given month divided by the number of publicly traded ﬁrms. The Relative IPO Market Temperature is
equal to the IPO ratio in the month preceding the IPO date minus the mean IPO ratio over the past 36 months,
divided by the IPO ratio’s standard deviation over the past 36 months. This variable measures whether the IPO
market is hot at the time a given IPO is issued.
1973 to 2003 IPOs 1973 to 1996 IPOs
Abnormal Abnormal
Sample Return Observations Return Observations
Panel A: All IPOs (unpurged versus purged benchmarks)
(1) All ﬁrms –0.3845 161,292 –0.3525 99,010
(–1.458) (–1.555)
Panel B: Issued in high versus low concentration industries (purged benchmarks)
(2) Issued in competitive industries –0.0187 83,168 0.0266 51,141
(–0.053) (0.085)
(3) Issued in concentrated industries –0.7731 78,062 –0.7584 47,838
(–3.534) (–3.770)
Panel C: VC versus non-VC backed IPOs (purged benchmarks)
(4) VC backed IPOs 0.1309 51,246 0.2811 28,741
(0.276) (0.646)
(5) non- VC backed IPOs –0.6335 110,046 –0.6434 70,269
(–3.405) (–3.675)
Panel D: Issued in high versus low IPO market temperature markets (purged benchmarks)
(6) Issued in cold markets –0.4224 84,738 –0.5078 52,328
(–1.680) (–2.012)
(7) Issued in hot markets –0.3324 76,551 –0.1649 46,679
(–1.004) (–0.609)
Panel E: Performance in recent high versus low past three year return markets (purged benchmarks)
(8) Issued after down markets –0.5387 84,568 –0.4343 52,156
(–1.840) (–1.899)
(9) Issued after up markets –0.2198 76,724 –0.2640 46,854
(–0.784) (–0.952)
Panel F: Small versus large IPOs (purged benchmarks)
(10) Small IPOs –0.3421 81,331 –0.4426 49,748
(–1.233) (–1.868)
(11) Large IPOs –0.4335 79,949 –0.2692 49,250
(–1.406) (–0.907)
26Table IX: Two by two tables of calendar-time averaged abnormal returns for various
IPO groupings
Explanation: The table reports average monthly abnormal returns (with t-statistics in parenthesis) for various
groups of IPOs. A monthly return in CRSP is identiﬁed as an IPO return if the given month is before the IPO’s
third anniversary. A ﬁrm’s abnormal return is its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio
matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year
returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Benchmark portfolios are purged of ﬁrms prior to
their ﬁfth IPO anniversary. The table presents results both for the full sample (1973 to 2003) and for a sample that
closely matches the one used in Lougharn and Ritter (2000). Each panel reports average abnormal returns for
portfolios comprised of IPOs based on various groupings. In all cases, IPOs are sorted into portfolio groups using
annual sorts. The Sales HHI is the Herﬁndahl index based on sales over all ﬁrms residing its three digit SIC
industry (averaged over the past three years). The venture capital dummy is one if the ﬁrm is venture capital
backed. Log IPO size is the natural logarithm of the issue proceeds. The Past 3-year Market return is the equal
weighted market return over the three years preceding the issue date. The IPO ratio is equal to the number of
IPOs in a given month divided by the number of publicly traded ﬁrms. The Relative IPO Market Temperature is
equal to the IPO ratio in the month preceding the IPO date minus the mean IPO ratio over the past 36 months,
divided by the IPO ratio’s standard deviation over the past 36 months. This variable measures whether the IPO
market is hot at the time a given IPO is issued.
1973 to 2003 IPOs 1973 to 1996 IPOs
Abnormal Abnormal
Sample Return Observations Return Observations
Panel A: VC-backed Status versus industry concentration (purged benchmarks)
(1) VC backed Competitive IPOs 0.4250 33,101 0.5911 18,793
(0.763) (1.066)
(2) VC backed Concentrated IPOs –0.2248 18,138 –0.0522 9,944
(–0.490) (–0.126)
(3) Non- VC backed Competitive IPOs –0.3666 50,067 –0.4018 32,348
(–1.391) (–1.789)
(4) Non- VC backed Concentrated IPOs –0.8865 59,924 –0.8917 37,894
(–4.680) (–4.278)
Panel B: IPO market temperature versus industry concentration (purged benchmarks)
(5) Cold Market Competitive IPOs –0.1089 43,051 –0.2387 26,982
(–0.341) (–0.814)
(6) Cold Market Concentrated IPOs –0.7700 41,661 –0.8271 25,342
(–3.011) (–3.017)
(7) Hot Market Competitive IPOs 0.0459 40,117 0.2724 24,159
(0.101) (0.656)
(8) Hot Market Concentrated IPOs –0.7392 36,398 –0.6239 22,493
(–2.812) (–2.639)
Panel C: VC-backed Status versus IPO market temperature (purged benchmarks)
(9) VC backed Cold Market IPOs 0.1699 25,322 0.1207 14,691
(0.374) (0.243)
(10) VC backed Hot Market IPOs 0.2805 25,924 0.6497 14,050
(0.473) (1.247)
(11) Non-VC backed Cold Market IPOs –0.7020 59,416 –0.8179 37,637
(–3.440) (–3.900)
(12) Non-VC backed Hot Market IPOs –0.5609 50,627 –0.4432 32,629
(–2.349) (–1.878)
27T
a
b
l
e
X
:
F
a
m
a
-
M
a
c
B
e
t
h
c
r
o
s
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
o
f
I
P
O
r
i
s
k
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
E
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
:
T
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
F
a
m
a
M
a
c
B
e
t
h
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
w
i
t
h
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
P
a
n
e
l
A
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
l
l
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
1
9
7
3
t
o
2
0
0
3
,
a
n
d
P
a
n
e
l
B
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
t
h
e
h
o
t
I
P
O
m
a
r
k
e
t
o
f
1
9
9
9
a
n
d
2
0
0
0
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
u
s
e
s
a
s
a
m
p
l
e
t
h
a
t
c
l
o
s
e
l
y
m
a
t
c
h
e
s
t
h
e
o
n
e
u
s
e
d
i
n
L
o
u
g
h
a
r
n
a
n
d
R
i
t
t
e
r
(
2
0
0
0
)
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
e
a
c
h
ﬁ
r
m
’
s
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
H
M
L
b
e
t
a
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
f
u
l
l
c
a
l
e
n
d
a
r
y
e
a
r
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
t
h
e
I
P
O
d
a
t
e
(
t
h
e
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
y
e
a
r
)
u
n
t
i
l
t
h
e
c
a
l
e
n
d
a
r
y
e
a
r
t
h
a
t
i
s
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
l
a
t
e
r
(
t
h
e
e
n
d
y
e
a
r
)
.
T
h
r
e
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
a
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
e
r
r
o
r
-
i
n
-
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
H
M
L
b
e
t
a
.
F
i
r
s
t
,
b
e
t
a
s
a
r
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
u
s
i
n
g
d
a
i
l
y
d
a
t
a
.
S
e
c
o
n
d
,
e
a
c
h
b
e
t
a
i
s
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
t
h
r
e
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
:
s
a
m
e
d
a
y
,
p
a
s
t
d
a
y
,
a
n
d
o
n
e
d
a
y
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
.
T
h
i
r
d
,
a
l
l
b
e
t
a
s
a
r
e
w
i
n
s
o
r
i
z
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
l
e
v
e
l
o
n
a
n
a
n
n
u
a
l
b
a
s
i
s
.
T
h
e
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
r
e
a
s
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
.
T
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
H
M
L
b
e
t
a
i
s
t
h
e
H
M
L
b
e
t
a
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
y
e
a
r
.
T
h
e
S
a
l
e
s
H
H
I
i
s
t
h
e
H
e
r
ﬁ
n
d
a
h
l
i
n
d
e
x
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
a
l
e
s
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
ﬁ
r
m
s
r
e
s
i
d
i
n
g
i
t
s
t
h
r
e
e
d
i
g
i
t
S
I
C
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
)
.
T
h
e
v
e
n
t
u
r
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
d
u
m
m
y
i
s
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
i
s
v
e
n
t
u
r
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
b
a
c
k
e
d
.
L
o
g
I
P
O
s
i
z
e
i
s
t
h
e
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
o
f
t
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
s
.
T
h
e
P
a
s
t
3
-
y
e
a
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
s
t
h
e
e
q
u
a
l
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
d
a
t
e
.
T
h
e
I
P
O
r
a
t
i
o
i
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
I
P
O
s
i
n
a
g
i
v
e
n
m
o
n
t
h
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
t
r
a
d
e
d
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
T
h
e
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
I
P
O
M
a
r
k
e
t
T
e
m
p
e
r
a
t
u
r
e
i
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
t
h
e
I
P
O
r
a
t
i
o
i
n
t
h
e
m
o
n
t
h
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
I
P
O
d
a
t
e
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
I
P
O
r
a
t
i
o
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
3
6
m
o
n
t
h
s
,
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
I
P
O
r
a
t
i
o
’
s
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
3
6
m
o
n
t
h
s
.
T
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
I
P
O
m
a
r
k
e
t
i
s
h
o
t
a
t
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
a
g
i
v
e
n
I
P
O
i
s
i
s
s
u
e
d
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
a
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
.
P
a
s
t
3
Y
e
a
r
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
S
a
l
e
s
V
C
B
a
c
k
e
d
L
o
g
M
a
r
k
e
t
I
P
O
M
a
r
k
e
t
H
M
L
R
i
s
k
O
b
s
e
r
-
H
H
I
D
u
m
m
y
I
P
O
S
i
z
e
R
e
t
u
r
n
s
T
e
m
p
e
r
a
t
u
r
e
E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
1
9
7
3
t
o
2
0
0
3
I
P
O
s
(
1
)
0
.
2
5
3
6
–
0
.
5
8
2
9
0
.
0
5
3
1
–
0
.
1
7
4
0
–
0
.
0
8
0
7
–
0
.
7
9
4
3
6
,
0
2
4
(
2
.
4
9
3
)
(
–
5
.
5
3
4
)
(
0
.
6
9
6
)
(
–
0
.
9
8
2
)
(
–
0
.
9
3
2
)
(
–
2
4
.
9
6
7
)
(
2
)
0
.
6
9
3
4
–
0
.
3
7
8
0
–
0
.
9
6
5
4
6
,
0
2
5
(
1
.
9
3
0
)
(
–
2
.
4
2
6
)
(
–
8
.
5
5
7
)
(
3
)
0
.
8
5
9
5
–
0
.
8
4
8
2
6
,
0
2
5
(
2
.
1
9
0
)
(
–
1
0
.
1
8
7
)
(
4
)
–
0
.
3
2
8
7
–
0
.
9
2
8
9
6
,
0
2
5
(
–
1
.
5
0
7
)
(
–
7
.
6
2
3
)
(
5
)
0
.
0
2
7
9
–
0
.
7
8
9
5
6
,
0
2
4
(
0
.
4
6
6
)
(
–
1
8
.
0
9
5
)
(
6
)
–
1
.
6
9
5
7
–
0
.
7
6
8
4
6
,
0
2
5
(
–
1
.
8
4
8
)
(
–
1
7
.
6
0
5
)
(
7
)
0
.
3
1
9
8
–
0
.
7
6
7
3
6
,
0
2
5
(
1
.
1
0
9
)
(
–
1
3
.
5
2
1
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
1
9
7
3
t
o
1
9
9
6
I
P
O
s
(
8
)
0
.
1
4
2
7
–
0
.
5
9
8
6
0
.
0
6
3
1
–
0
.
1
7
1
9
–
0
.
0
9
2
1
–
0
.
7
9
6
3
4
,
4
6
7
(
1
.
3
2
9
)
(
–
4
.
8
1
2
)
(
0
.
6
8
8
)
(
–
0
.
8
1
8
)
(
–
0
.
8
8
2
)
(
–
2
0
.
9
0
6
)
(
9
)
0
.
6
7
1
4
–
0
.
3
4
9
8
–
1
.
0
0
1
7
4
,
4
6
8
(
1
.
5
4
4
)
(
–
1
.
8
8
2
)
(
–
7
.
3
9
3
)
(
1
0
)
0
.
8
6
2
2
–
0
.
8
6
7
7
4
,
4
6
8
(
1
.
8
1
4
)
(
–
8
.
6
5
8
)
(
1
1
)
–
0
.
2
8
6
3
–
0
.
9
5
9
3
4
,
4
6
8
(
–
1
.
0
9
3
)
(
–
6
.
5
3
1
)
(
1
2
)
0
.
0
2
8
1
–
0
.
8
0
0
4
4
,
4
6
7
(
0
.
3
9
4
)
(
–
1
5
.
3
7
1
)
(
1
3
)
–
1
.
9
9
5
3
–
0
.
7
7
3
6
4
,
4
6
8
(
–
1
.
8
1
0
)
(
–
1
4
.
7
9
4
)
(
1
4
)
0
.
3
8
9
0
–
0
.
7
7
2
2
4
,
4
6
8
(
1
.
1
1
8
)
(
–
1
1
.
3
0
8
)
28